Last week, the Biden administration said it would allow the Azov Brigade, a Ukrainian military unit, to receive U.S. weaponry and training, freeing it from a purported ban imposed in response to concerns that it committed human rights violations and had neo-Nazi ties.
A photo posted by the unit itself, however, seems to suggest that the U.S. was providing support as far back as December of last year.
The photo, in tandem with the administration’s own statements, highlights the murky nature of the arms ban, how it was imposed, and under what U.S. authority. Two mechanisms could have barred arms transfers: a law passed by Congress specifically prohibiting assistance to Azov, and the so-called Leahy laws that block support to units responsible for grave rights violations.
“My guess is that the Department found that the Brigade is a ‘new unit,’ distinguishable from the Battalion and the Regiment.”
The State Department said this month that weapon shipments will now go forward after a Leahy law review, but won’t comment on if and when a Leahy ban was in effect. The congressional prohibition, the U.S. says, does not apply because it barred assistance to the Azov Battalion, a predecessor to the Azov Brigade. The original unit had earned scrutiny for alleged human rights violations and ties to neo-Nazi and white supremacist ideologies.
The U.S. has not made clear about when the apparent ban started, but a deputy Azov commander and media reports indicate some type of prohibition has been in effect for nearly a decade — though the congressional ban has only been in effect since 2018.
“There was a request for resources for the 12th Special Forces Brigade, which prompted a Leahy vetting process, in which they were found to be eligible,” a State Department spokesperson told The Intercept, suggesting the approval process did not deal with any existing bans. (The State Department did not respond to questions asking for clarity if that was the case.)
One former American official said that because of the unit’s byzantine history of reorganizations and official status, the State Department should better explain its decisions.
“Given the history of the Azov Regiment, the Azov Battalion, and the Azov Brigade, the State Department’s ought to provide a more detailed rationale for the finding that the Brigade is eligible pursuant to the Leahy law,” Charles Blaha, the former director of the State Department’s Office of Security and Human Rights, told The Intercept. “My guess is that the Department found that the Brigade is a ‘new unit,’ distinguishable from the Battalion and the Regiment. If that’s correct, the Department should say so.”
U.S. Special Ops Training
Restrictions on U.S. military support may have been in effect when the Azov Brigade’s official Telegram channel and X account announced in March that the unit’s personnel recently completed an American military training. The course, on civil–military cooperation, was provided by U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, or SOCEUR, according to the posts.
One attached photo shows a captain in the Azov unit being presented with a certificate dated December 2023 by a person with a blurred face in U.S. military fatigues. A second photo shows a group of people in U.S. military apparel holding an American flag next to a group of several dozen others, some of whom are holding a flag with the Azov insignia.
Department of Defense spokesperson Tim Gorman would not comment on the SOCEUR training, including whether or not it was legal, and referred The Intercept to the State Department. (The Azov unit did not respond to a request for comment.)
The State Department also declined to answer repeated questions about the SOCEUR training and its legality, or whether there had been other U.S. military training with Azov before clearing the group under the Leahy laws.
The spokesperson told The Intercept that it found no evidence of the Azov Brigade committing violations of human rights that would bar American aid under the Leahy laws.
Russia has tried to discredit the Azov Brigade, the State Department spokesperson said, by conflating it with its predecessor, the Azov Battalion militia. The Azov Battalion, which is under congressional sanctions, was absorbed into the Ukrainian National Guard in 2014 then underwent several more reorganizations before becoming a brigade in 2023. Others have echoed concerns of propaganda against Azov, pointing to Russia’s amplification of claims about Nazis in Ukraine to justify its invasion.
“That militia disbanded in 2015 and the composition of Special Forces Brigade Azov is significantly different,” the spokesperson noted. Another spokesperson, meanwhile, said, “The Battalion was disbanded in 2014 and the United States has never provided security assistance to the ‘Azov battalion.’”
With the State Department leaning on the distinction between the “battalion” and the “brigade” to get around congressional sanctions, some representatives are moving to shore up the statutory ban on military support to Azov. In recent days, the proposed defense appropriations language was updated.
“None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used to provide arms, training, intelligence, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion, the Third Separate Assault Brigade, or any successor organization,” the new language reads, gesturing to a brigade created by Battalion veterans, as well as the Azov Brigade itself. The current language in effect only addresses the Azov Battalion.
A former House staffer who was involved in efforts to ban support to Azov, requesting anonymity for fear of threats from the group, told The Intercept, “The fact that Congress is moving so quickly to reaffirm that the ban does apply to ‘successor organizations’ like the Azov Regiment, Azov Brigade, or whatever else they might change their name to next, shows that the White House view doesn’t hold water.”
Significantly Different?
As it is, the State Department’s limited rationale for lifting arms restrictions rests on the claim that the composition of the battalion and the brigade are “significantly different.” That finding would be made under provisions of the Leahy determinations that allow for differentiating between old and “fundamentally different units,” such as changes in leadership and culture.
Yet the Azov unit has significant continuity and, while Leahy laws are concerned with human rights, the State Department’s appeal to the Leahy determination may not cover the ideological justification of the congressional ban on the transfer of arms, training, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion.
Azov commander Denys Prokopenko and deputy commander Svyatoslav Palamar, for instance, are holdovers from the original battalion militia. And, along with other higher-ranking Azov members, they are linked to white supremacist and neo-Nazi ideologies, as Ukrainian journalist Lev Golinkin reported in The Nation last year.
“If the White House wants to arm and train the most neo-Nazi-linked group in Ukraine, it should push for Congress to remove the ban.”
The suggestion that the battalion was “disbanded” and the brigade is “significantly different” is also undermined by the unit’s own words. A page on their website celebrates its 10-year anniversary. “This is the path from a few dozen volunteers, who had only motivation and faith in justice, to a special purpose brigade — one of the most effective units of the Defense Forces,” it reads.
Another biographical page suggests the Azov Battalion was never actually dissolved, but subsumed into the official Ukrainian military structure. “On September 17, 2014, by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the ‘Azov’ battalion was reorganized and expanded into the ‘Azov’ special purpose militia regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” the page says. “On November 11, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine signed an order on the transfer of the ‘Azov’ regiment to the National Guard of Ukraine, with its further staffing up to the combat standard of the National Guard brigades.”
Josh Paul, a former director in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs who resigned in protest of the administration’s policy on Israel’s Gaza war, told The Intercept he was not aware of any standing restriction on Azov. He recalled speaking to subject matter experts who said there were no concerns, and, as far as he knew, the unit had been eligible for aid since at least 2022. “My understanding is that they genuinely are different entities,” he said, adding that he did not see any evidence while at the State Department to suggest the Azov Brigade should be prohibited from receiving security assistance.
Ukrainian officials, for their part, seemed to suggest to the Washington Post that there was indeed a ban, one that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba apparently raised to Secretary of State Antony Blinken last month. (Paul said there was “something odd going on, but my solid recollection is that there was no restriction, so I’m not sure what the Ukrainians are on about.”)
Two months ago — after the social media pictures appearing to show the training — Prokopenko, the Azov commander, said on X, “Azov is still blacklisted from receiving any U.S. aid.” In a May post, Prokopenko complained Azov had fought to defend Mariupol in 2022 with limited resources and outdated weapons because of the congressional ban on aid — suggesting the statutory sanctions applied to the unit at the time.
“The unavoidable reality is that there is a current ban on U.S. arms and training going to the Azov units,” said the former House staffer. “If the White House wants to arm and train the most neo-Nazi-linked group in Ukraine, it should push for Congress to remove the ban.”
“That may be a tall ask, however, as Congress is currently seeking to strengthen the law, rather than weaken it.”