War Clouds Over Lebanon as Hezbollah and Israel Clash

The escalating military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel now threatens to expand the conflict in Gaza into a full-blown regional war. For the past eight months, Israel and Hezbollah have traded missile attacks, leading to the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians from northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The two sides have fought devastating wars in the past, but a cold peace has reigned for nearly 17 years. That peace is now in jeopardy, as Hezbollah has mobilized in sympathy with Hamas following Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip. To discuss the situation this week on Intercepted is Sam Heller, a fellow with the Century Foundation and expert on Lebanon and Hezbollah. Heller spoke with host Murtaza Hussain on the prospects of the conflict escalating, as well as the potential impact on the Lebanese, Israelis, and the broader Middle East.

Transcript

[Intercepted theme music.]

Murtaza Hussain: Welcome to Intercepted. I’m Murtaza Hussain.

The Israeli military and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah are currently in a state of low-level conflict that began with Israel’s invasion of Gaza last October. This conflict has claimed hundreds of lives, mostly in Lebanon, while forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli and Lebanese civilians from their homes, with no prospect of return. As devastating as the war in Gaza has been, an Israeli war with Hezbollah would be magnitudes worse.

Hezbollah, which was originally created out of local resistance to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, is believed to have up to 200,000 missiles ready to be fired at Israel in the case of a full blown war. Israel, meanwhile, has threatened to destroy Lebanese cities as part of a military strategy known as the Dahiya Doctrine. That doctrine emphasizes inflicting mass damage to civilian infrastructure in a conflict.

A war between Israel and Hezbollah would truly be a catastrophic event for Israel, Lebanon, and the entire Middle East. Though no side truly seems to want such a war, there are strong signs today that it is becoming more likely nonetheless.

Joining me now to discuss the implications of such a conflict is Sam Heller, a researcher and analyst looking at Lebanon, Syria, and the wider neighborhood. He’s a fellow with Century International, the Century Foundation’s Center for International Research and Policy. He joins us from Beirut.

Sam, welcome to Intercepted.

Sam Heller: Hey, thanks for having me.

MH: To start, can you tell us a bit about the political situation in Lebanon at the moment, vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel? Obviously, tensions have increased in the last eight months since the war in Gaza began, but hostilities between the two stem back much further.

In 2006, there was a very devastating war that took place between Israel and Hezbollah, which resulted in significant destruction and loss of life in Lebanon. Since then, there’s been a détente, which has existed between the two sides going on 17 years or so. But, at the moment, that seems to be breaking up. Israeli officials have threatened widespread retaliation in Lebanon, even in Beirut and other major city centers.

In your estimation, how do people assess the risk of such a war taking place? And what would the implications be for the Lebanese people if it did happen, especially if the skirmishes expand beyond South Lebanon to where they’re mostly confined today?

SH: I mean, obviously, the calm that had mostly prevailed in the country’s south or along — I guess they call it the Blue Line, right? It’s the de facto border that divides Lebanon and Israel.

So, the calm that had held there since 2006 broke down on October 8, the day after October 7. That’s when Hezbollah fired on Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. The Israelis retaliated, and then it kind of turned into this ongoing tit for tat exchange of fire that has continued, and then sort of mutated, transformed with time, right? As both sides have expanded the scope of their targeting, adapted their tactics. Maybe some of the weapons that they’ve introduced.

I don’t think things have entirely gotten out of control yet. A thing that seemed to characterize the balance on the Blue Line prior to October 8 was that you had both Hezbollah and Israel — even when things would flare up, when there would be, maybe, a provocation or an exchange of fire — it seemed pretty clear that both sides were thinking, I think, pretty deliberately about how to effectively signal to the other. To maintain a sort of reciprocity, and keep up a stable deterrent balance.

Now things are a lot more kinetic and violent, but it looks like both sides are still thinking in terms of how to respond, how to position themselves such that they maintain deterrence opposite their enemy here. I don’t think that either side has really opened things up. I think that’s the concern but, fortunately, we’re not there yet. Whether that’s going to happen, I don’t know, right? I mean, I don’t think anyone does, except for maybe the Israelis.

So, I was here in October — here in Beirut, that is — and then I was out of the country in November/December, and I got back in January. The first thing that I wanted to know when I got back was, I wanted to ask people, hey, how concerned are you, how concerned should I be about the risk of a more open and total conflict? And I got different answers.

I think that what I heard from Western diplomats and some Lebanese who had visibility into some of the processes of mediation that were ongoing to deescalate on the Blue Line, I think they said that they were very concerned. And that they treated the Israelis’ threats to intervene more fully as credible and serious.

But I think that there was a real sort of cognitive dissonance when I would talk with other people here in Lebanon who, I think, were just much less concerned. Either because they were preoccupied with other issues, who would just sort of put what was going on in the South out of mind. Even for people who were more interested in this and thinking about it more, people who basically thought that the Israelis, A, would not undertake a larger intervention because it’s a bad idea, because it doesn’t make sense. Second, that they wouldn’t do it because the Americans wouldn’t allow it.

I also think that it would be a bad idea for the Israelis to do this. I think that it would be, if they attempted to invade, to stage some larger intervention in Lebanon, I think it would likely be a bloody, destructive mess. More for the Lebanese but, for both sides, realistically, right? But then, also one that would be inconclusive, that I don’t think would accomplish what the Israelis seem to be looking for. But I also don’t trust them to make good choices, having seen how they’ve conducted themselves basically since October 7 and in Gaza. I don’t think we should necessarily assume that they’re going to approach this in a totally coolheaded, rational way.

MH: You’ve written a lot about Hezbollah in the context of the Syrian conflict and, of course, the group has changed and evolved a lot since 2006, the last time that there was a war in South Lebanon. There are some estimates that Hezbollah has between 120,000 to 200,000 missiles which could be deployed against Israel in the context of such a war.

If there were a conflict to take place, and if Israel, say, invaded South Lebanon to establish a buffer zone with the goal of seriously degrading or defeating Hezbollah, what do you think the retaliatory consequences could be, from Hezbollah’s perspective? Or what capacity do they have, which have maybe exceeded those they had in the past as a non-state militant group?

SH: I think it’s hard to know precisely what they would do because, I think, Hezbollah is deliberately sort of cagey about its real capabilities and what it could bring to bear. When the group does pin a more specific number to, for example, the number of trained Hezbollah fighters or the number of missiles in its arsenal, it’s hard to know what is real and what is, maybe, braggadocio, a bluff.

But I think that the Israeli voices that seem to be advocating a ground invasion, potentially in occupation of Lebanon, potentially 10 kilometers north of the Blue Line, it doesn’t make a ton of sense to me. It seems responsive to what seemed to be the preeminent Israeli concerns following October 7. Prior to that, the Israelis seemed most concerned about Hezbollah’s precision missile arsenal, and then the ways that that could threaten Israeli population centers and critical infrastructure.

But, after October 7, it seems like the Israelis — and then this seems to have been additionally conveyed via mediators in some of these talks around de-escalation — the Israelis seem much more concerned with this more proximate threat posed by Hezbollah on the border, right? They don’t want Hezbollah’s elite Radwan forces present deployed along the border, they don’t want Hezbollah to be able to amass forces there for a potential October 7-style infiltration attempt. Particularly, I think, after the ensuing exchanges of fire that have followed October 7, I think we’ve seen that Hezbollah’s, their anti-tank guided missiles have seemed particularly effective. So, I think the Israelis also want Hezbollah’s forces beyond the roughly 10-kilometer range of these anti-tank missiles.

I mean, it seems to me if the Israelis push 10 kilometers north — First, that’s not going to be a walk in the park, right? I think that will meet fierce resistance. Second, they’ll have moved the center of gravity of this conflict a little ways north, kind of slightly out of range of some of these northern Israeli communities, from which 60,000 people have been evacuated since October. But it’s still going to be this hot frontline where Israeli forces are going to be targeted with regularity. It’s going to be subject to infiltration attempts by Hezbollah, potentially other armed factions in Lebanon, either Lebanese or Palestinian.

And then, I don’t think that [Hezbollah] have unveiled the totality of their arsenal. I think that some of their longer-range missiles, it seems like maybe they’re holding them in reserve. But then, even with some of the weapons that they have employed so far, they’ve demonstrated a range that is beyond 10 kilometers; for example, these groups of drones. They’ll still be able to reach beyond that buffer, and then to hold these northern Israeli communities at risk.

So, it does not compute for me. I mean, this idea that the Israelis could somehow intervene in this way, and then get what they’re looking for.

MH: Sam, one thing which is very interesting is, presently, the war in Gaza is in its eighth month, and it’s inflicted tremendous damage on Gaza, and certainly millions of people have been displaced, or hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, tens of thousands have been killed. And, certainly, ordinary life in Gaza is no longer possible.

As catastrophic as that war has been, it seems the assessment of many observers would be that a war between Israel and Hezbollah would be far, far more destabilizing for people in Lebanon, people in Israel, throughout the country, potentially, and as well as the region writ large.

What is your sense of the possible escalatory risks in this conflict? If it were to stumble into a very wide-ranging war between these two parties, what’s the worst case scenario that could happen, and how likely do you assess that?

SH: It seems for sure that it would be devastating for both Lebanon and Israel. I mean, Lebanon more than Israel, realistically, given the disparity in relative power here. But I think it would also do real damage to Israel. The ways in which that could expand and metastasize regionally, it’s hard to know.

It’s plausible that it could draw in the Americans more directly, even as I don’t think the Biden administration wants to see an open war between Israel and Hezbollah, and I think that they are making a good faith attempt to avert it. But if it happened, it’s possible that the Americans would intervene more fully and directly in support of Israel.

We could also see stepped-up involvement by Iran, and by other members of the Iran-led Resistance Axis regionally. I think it’s maybe hard to know in all instances how much reserve capacity they have, or how much further they can escalate. I mean, obviously, a lot of them are already involved, but I think that the escalatory potential is real and substantial. And then, obviously, the human toll would be terrible.

MH: This nascent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah started In the aftermath of the October 7 attacks and subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza. Describe to us the relation between these two conflicts.

Obviously, Israel, in some sense, is disaggregating them, and views this conflict with Hezbollah as, in some sense, independent. But Hezbollah seems to be acting out of sympathy or — if not in coordination with Hamas — to aid or to move forces away from Gaza, to force them to defend the northern border.

What would the impact of a ceasefire have? Would it be salient, and would it actually help perhaps avert a war, which we’re describing at the moment?

SH: Hezbollah and Iran are both members of this Iran-led Resistance Axis. Over the past several years they’ve promoted this idea of the unity of arenas or battlefields, and the possibility of this type of collective response in the event that any Axis member comes under attack. So, this conflict has been a real kind of road test of that.

Hezbollah and Hamas, they don’t seem like they are entirely simpatico. Apparently, from the early years of the Syrian conflict, they were sort of mutually estranged after Hamas sided with the Syrian opposition militants against the government of Bashar al-Assad, alongside which Hezbollah had intervened. Likewise Iran, and various other Iran-linked groups. But that’s a relationship that they were subsequently able to mend. So, they are allies, even if they aren’t totally of one mind.

So, it was Hezbollah that initiated this now months-long conflict along the Blue Line. They justified it at the time as an act of solidarity with the Palestinian people, the resistance in Gaza. But then, also, as a step towards liberating what remains of Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. I think that rationale has subsequently evolved somewhat as this conflict has become more protracted.

Now, I think that Hezbollah justifies its involvement first as what they call a “support front,” as a means of relieving pressure on Gaza, preoccupying the Israelis, obliging them to commit some substantial portion of their forces on Israel’s northern front with Lebanon. But then, also, I think Hezbollah will say that what they’re doing now, they’ll describe it as a preemptive defense of Lebanon. That, realistically, the only deterrent to fuller Israeli intervention in Lebanon is Hezbollah and its capabilities. And so, Hezbollah — by intervening as it has, and then keeping up this exchange of fire — that by now keeping up with this months-long lower grade war, that they are actually deterring the Israelis from carrying out something larger.

But I think that they will also say that they’ve been suspicious of U.S. and other Western attempts to mediate some de-escalation along the Blue Line, because they’ve said that these are efforts to divide the fronts, to disaggregate between this conflict in Gaza and in Lebanon, which they reject. They refuse to stand down and to engage on the terms of any sort of agreement that might de-escalate conflict along the Blue Line until there is a ceasefire in Gaza. And then, critically, not a unilaterally-announced de-escalation or ceasefire declared from the Israeli side, but one that is agreed with Palestinian factions.

Obviously, that has not, so far, been forthcoming. But I think that Hezbollah will point to the ceasefire in November — [during] which Hezbollah also halted its attacks — as evidence that a Gaza ceasefire would similarly unlock calm on the Blue Line with the Israelis. I mean, it seems like they may be operating according to slightly different calculus.

It seems like, from the start — per, at least, some American and Israeli reporting that we’ve seen — there was discussion in the Israeli government of intervening preemptively against Hezbollah, on the grounds that this war with Hezbollah was the war that Israel had prepared for, and that Hezbollah was the more serious threat to Israel’s security. Why they didn’t do that, I guess, it depends on the account.

I mean, in some articles — I guess, U.S. sources — will say that the Americans dissuaded them. But even as the Israelis ultimately decided against that, part of the logic of the war that they have waged in Gaza has seemed to have been as a sort of deterrent exercise aimed at Hezbollah, and then other regional enemies. That’s why you get Israeli officials pointing to — very explicitly, right? — pointing to Gaza, and then saying that “we will reproduce this in Beirut. We will do this in Lebanon.”

I think that October 7 seems like it was a real, maybe fatal blow to Israel’s security paradigm, this idea that the Israelis could unilaterally impose security on their regional surroundings through sheer force. Everything that they’ve done in Gaza since then, what they’ve done in Lebanon, what they may do in Lebanon, I don’t know if there’s a way for them to reconstitute that deterrence. But It looks like that’s maybe some of what they’ve got in mind, in addition to kind of realizing some of these more specific and tangible concerns related to Hezbollah’s proximity to the border, and then reassuring residents of northern Israel in a way that would permit them to return.

But if you can have a ceasefire in Gaza — which unfortunately does not seem imminent currently — it seems like that is a prerequisite for a deal on the Blue Line.

MH: Sam, it’s a very curious situation, too, because obviously Hezbollah is the most powerful military force in Lebanon — more so than the Lebanese military — but it’s not technically democratically accountable to the Lebanese people, and it’s very polarizing and divisive among some factions of Lebanese society, and maybe particularly so after the Syrian war.

How do other parties in Lebanon perceive the situation? Because, obviously, if there was a war — which Hezbollah seems to be trying to avoid for the most part — the consequences would still impact Lebanese to some degree, without distinction of their political sympathies or other backgrounds. How do Hezbollah fit in politically in Lebanon’s domestic political landscape?

SH: I think that there is maybe a broader anxiety across Lebanon’s different political constituencies and factions that this conflict in the south may turn into a fuller, more devastating war. But, short of that, I think that the really pointed and direct criticisms of Hezbollah’s involvement and its now ongoing engagement with the Israelis have mostly been limited to just elements of the Christian right?

Most of the country seems sort of tacitly understanding of this. And I think that after, I guess, depending on how you count it, several Israeli invasions, extended Israeli occupation of the country, Israel’s regular attempts to scare, to intimidate Lebanese, threats to return the country to the Stone Age. Israel is, I think, generally viewed here among not all, but I think most Lebanese as the preeminent threat. To Lebanon, Hezbollah, which is, yes, controversial, for, I think, good reasons, including some of what it’s done abroad, some of what it does at home. Nonetheless, Hezbollah is the only force in Lebanon that’s able to stand up and to plausibly deter the Israelis.

I think also it’s tough to get a fuller sense of this but, at least anecdotally, I’ve heard some people say — again, not among kind of elements of more right wing Christian parties, but among some Lebanese Sunnis, for example, who had been alienated from Hezbollah as a result of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, in support of the government of the Assad regime — that there’s been some real appreciation for and support of Hezbollah since October. As they’ve seen Hezbollah, and then alongside it some other factions, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic jihad has carried out a few actions, the Lebanese chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood has reactivated its armed wing.

But principally it is Hezbollah that has been carrying this front, and then waging now this extended and costly fight in support of Gaza.

MH: Sam, my last question, given the implications of this conflict, if it were to take place — a very broad-ranging conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, both regionally and, for the people of the two countries, as well as the broader world — what should U.S. and foreign diplomats be doing to try to bring this conflict to an end? What would be most efficacious in steering off this potential disaster? And what can they do in the short term to try to bring the two sides back from the brink?

SH: You need a Gaza ceasefire.

There may have been some optimism earlier on in the war, that the U.S. in particular might be able to mediate some agreement to achieve de-escalation or calm on the Blue Line. But it seems like they hit a wall, right? Because I think that it became apparent that, really, all that the Americans and other Interested outsiders could do was sort of precook a deal. Hezbollah isn’t willing to engage on the substance currently of any agreement.

But then, you can talk with some Lebanese figures who are proximate to Hezbollah, who I think can plausibly represent its outlook and interests. And then, you can sort of pre-negotiate an agreement that is likely acceptable to Hezbollah. You can have that sort of fleshed out and in place. But then, you can’t consummate it until you have the Gaza ceasefire.

Maybe the Americans thought that they’d have one by now, right? That that was more achievable. It seems like they’ve made some announcements to that effect prematurely. But, because of the way that all these things interlock and fit together, and then because of the so-far unavailability of that just really crucial piece, there is just no immediate prospect for turning this off.

And then, periodically before that, you get these Israeli threats to substantially escalate. And then, like, how credible that is, whether this is the time that it will materialize. Who knows?

MH: Sam, thanks so much for joining us on Intercepted.

SH: Thanks for having me on.

MH: That was Sam Heller, a researcher and analyst looking at Lebanon, Syria, and the wider neighborhood, and a fellow with Century International. And that does it for this episode of Intercepted.

Intercepted is a production of The Intercept. Laura Flynn produced this episode. Rick Kwan mixed our show. Legal review by David Bralow, Sean Musgrave, and Elizabeth Sanchez. This episode was transcribed by Leonardo Faierman. And our theme music, as always, was composed by DJ Spooky.

Thank you so much to our supporters and listeners. If you haven’t already, please subscribe to Intercepted and our other podcast, Deconstructed. Also, do leave us a rating and review whenever you find our podcast. It helps other listeners to find us as well.

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Thank you so much for joining us. Until next time, I’m Murtaza Hussain.